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Grippando: Condominium Rulemaking--Presumptions, Burdens, and Abuses: A Call

NOTES
CONDOMINIUM, RULEMAKING- PRESUMPTIONS,
I I BURDENS AND ABUSES: A CALL FOR
SUBSTANTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW IN FLORIDA
INTRODUCTION

Demographic and economic changes over the past decade have made condominiums a popular alternative to traditional homes or rental units. An increase in the number of personal and legal problems has attended the increase
in* condominium popularity.2 Developers and condominium associations3

attempt to avoid such disputes by imposing use restrictions and conduct regulations upon-unit owners.4 The developer establishes rules in the statutorily
1. See Condominium Housing Issues: Hearings on Condominium Conversions and S. 612
Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 559 (19792> (statement of Jay Janis, Under
Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings]. The two most rapidly growing population segments are the thirty to forty-five
age group and the sector comprised of those over sixty-five. Id. at 567. These age groups
encompass many smaller families, increased divorce and separation rates, and single headed
households. Id. Inflation and expectations of future inflation, rapidly accelerated housing
costs, increased foreign investment, vacation home popularity, and federal income tax
considerations, have combined with demographic changes to increase demand for Florida
condominiums. See DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES AND CONDOMINIUMS, DE'T OF BUSINESS
REGULATIONS, CONDOMINIUM CONVERSIONS IN FLORIDA: A REPORT To GOVERNOR BOB GRAHAM,

4, 13-14 (1980) [hereinafter cited as REPORT TO GOVERNOR BOB GRAHAM]. Almost one and a
half million persons live in over 600,000 Florida condominium units. Id. at 4. Experts predict
that -within twenty years condominiums will comprise 50% of the nation's dwelling
units. See U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, National Condominium
Study (1975) (mandated by the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-383, § 821, 88 Stat. 633 (1974) [hereinafter cited as HUD Study]. Cf. Condomania:
Symbol of Things to Come, FLA. TREND, Oct. 1972, at 35 (similar prediction for Florida's
population). See also Nagin, The Condominium Conversion Craze: What's Happening in
Florida?,55 FLA. B.J. 74 (1981).
2. See Condominium Development and Sales Practices: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on General Oversight and Renegotiation of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and
Housing, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (1976) (report submitted by Carla Hills, Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development describing problems unit owners have had in adjusting

to their neighbors' lifestyles) [hereinafter cited as 1976 House Hearings]; REAL EsTATE LAw
AND PRACTICE, PRACTICING LAw INsrTruTE CONDOMINIUM REVISITED: SOLVING THE PROBLEMs OF
RAPID DEVELOPMENT 2,2-25 (1977) (discussing personal conflicts between unit owners and
condominium government officers). See also, Poliakoff, Conflicting Rights in Condominium
Living, 54 FLA. B.J. 756 (1980); Condos in the Courts: A Rundown of Recent Opinions, 3
CONDOMINIUM REP. 8 (1975).
3. See FI.
STAT. § 718.104(4)() (1981) (the condominium association is created by the
developer); id. § 718.104(4)(i) (unit owners become automatic members in the association
and have voting rights). See also URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, COMMUNITY AssocIATioNs: A GUIDE
FOR Punuc OFFIclas 4 (1980).
. 4. See URBAN LAND INSrrruTE, CREATING A COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION: Tim DEVELoPrE'S

ROLE 31 (1977) (distinguishing the developer's from the association's roles) [hereinafter cited
as DEvELoP'Ens ROLE]. The developer establishes use restrictions in the declaration of
condominium, which is the legal document binding the association together. FILA. STAT.
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required declaration 5 and bylaws. 6 The association, comprised of all unit
owners, subsequently enforces and promulgates rules through its elected board
of directors. 7 Justiciable controversies arise when these rulemakers act in bad
faith," beyond the scope of their authority9 or in an arbitrary and capricious
manner.10 Unless constrained by the courts, such rulemaking abuses may substantially interfere with the unit owners' use and enjoyment of their individual units and the property shared in common with other unit owners.1,
The similarities between condominium associations and administrative
agencies have prompted some courts to apply federal administrative law
principles when reviewing condominium rulemaking. 12 One similarity is the
§ 718.503(2)0) & (o) (1981). The developer must execute and acknowledge a declaration of
condominium meeting the requirements of a deed. The condominium is not created until
the developer records the legal documents at the local land registry. Id. § 718.104(2). See
Crockett, Protecting the Deposit of the "Consumer" Who Purchases a New Condominium
Apartment, 8 HAWAI B.J. 103, 116 (1972) (securities laws have not preempted real property
legal requirements binding the condominium offerings' real estate characteristics). Use restrictions contained or referred to in the recorded declaration run with the land and bind
subsequent unit owners. See Pepe v. Whispering Sands Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 351
So. 2d 755, 757 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1977) (association's vote to merge the condominium's common
elements with a neighboring complex could not override a conflicting nonmerger provision
in the declaration). See also J. VAN DOREN, CONDOMINIUMS, THE LAW IN FLORIDA 15 (1980)
(itemizing statutory requirements of the declaration). The bylaws established by the developer
delineate administrative procedures for the association and also contain use restrictions. See
FLA. STAT. § 718.112 (1981). The developer often incorporates these restrictions into the
declaration by reference. See infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text. The association's
elected board of directors can adopt further operational regulations, enforce condominium
rules, and assess penalties for violations. See URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, MANAGING A SUCCESSFUL
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION

14 (2d ed. 1976) (describing board of directors' powers) [herein-

after cited as SUCCESSFUL ASSOCIATION]. See also J. HOLEMAN, CONDOMINIUM MANAGEMENT 221
(1980) (criticizing bylaw provisions requiring unanimous consent of unit owners to approve
association activity).
5. FLA. STAT. § 718.104 (1981). For sample forms of Florida declarations, see Fla. B.
Continuing Legal Educ., 2 FLA. REAL PROP. & PRAC., 588-643 (2d ed. 1975) and R. BoYER,
3 FLA. REAL EST. TRANSACrIONS F-61 to 155 (1977). See also K. ROMNEY, CONDOMINIUM DEVELOPMENT GUIDE 513-8 to 60 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (nationally oriented).
6. FLA. STAT. § 718.104(4)(k) (1981). See DEvELoPER's ROLE, supra note 4, at 40-43 (describing the condominium's basic documents). For sample forms see R. BOYER, supra note 5 at
F-I to F-616.
7. See DEvE-oPER's ROLE, supra note 4, at 23, 42 (development and powers of the
board). The developer appoints the initial board members. Unit owners elect a new board
at the first annual membership meeting. Id.
8. See PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2, at 22 (boards sometimes harass a unit
owner with discriminatory rules).
9. See Mavrakis v. Plaza del Sol Ass'n, No. 77-6049 CIV-WMH, slip op. at 5 (S.D. Fla.
May 11, 1978) (rule improper because an amendment to the declaration is required).
10. See Note, Judicial Review of Condominium Rulemaking, 94 HAnv. L. REv. 647, 658
(1981).
11. Unchecked abuse endangers a unit owner's enjoyment of his property because of the
substantive scope of rulemaking powers. See infra note 16.
12. Compare Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971)
(court must determine whether the agency properly construed its statutory authority and invalidate acts which are arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion) with Hidden Harbour
Estates v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1975) (condominium association
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method of establishment. Both administrative agencies and condominium
associations are established by statute. Federal law establishes administrative
agencies' 3 while condominium associations are created under the authority of
a state statute. 4 Agencies and associations also share the primary purpose of
protecting the general welfare of the citizens subject to that authority. 5
Finally, the association's rulemaking, adjudicatory and enforcement powers
resemble an administrative agency's quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial action
both procedurally and substantively."
must act within the scope of authority defined by the statute, declaration and bylaws and
cannot adopt arbitrary or capricious rules unrelated to a legitimate purpose of the condominium). See also Scavo, Dispute Resolution in a Community Association, 17 URB. L. ANN.
295, 319-26 (1979); Note, supra note 10, at 658-63. But see Kroop v. Caravelle Condominium
Inc., 323 So. 2d 807, 309 (Fla. Sd D.C.A. 1975), as construed in PRACcmN LAw INsrmrrr , supra
note 2, at 23-24 (court merely balances collective against common interests to achieve reasonable result).
Some jurisdictions outside Florida have analogized condominium association rulemaking
to corporate decisionmaking. Equitable review in these states involves a similar reasonableness
standard, but specific corporate principles permit inquiry into the condominium board of
directors' decisionmaking process. See Papalexiou v. Tower W. Condominium, 167 NJ. Super.
516, 527, 401 A.2d 280, 285 (Ch. Div. 1979) (arbitrary rulemaking violates the business
judgment rule); Rywalt v. Writer Corp., 34 Colo. App. 334, 337, 526 P.2d 316, 317 (1974)
(applying business judgment rule to uphold decision of subdivision rulemakers); Note, supra
note 10, at 663-67 (describing the corporate analogue as the preferred model for judicial
review of condominium rulemaking); Condo Associations: What to do When Your Gripe is
With a Developer Who Has Control of Your Board, 4 CONDOMINIUM REP., July, 1976, at 6-7
(suggesting that the condominium association board of directors, like corporate directors, owe
a fiduciary duty to their electors).
13. E.g, 15 U.S.C. §§ 761-86 (1976) (creation of the Federal Energy Administration); 15
U.S.C. §§ 2051-81 (1976) (creation of the Consumer Product Safety Commission); 29 U.S.C.
§§ 651-78 (1976) (granting regulatory power to the Secretary of Labor, which led to the
establishment of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration); 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960
(1976) (reiponsibility for stringent coal mine safety standards); 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-20 (1976) (responsibility for stringent coal mine safety standards); 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-20 (1976) (creation
of Energy Research and Development Administration); Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1970, 3 C.F.R.
199 (1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 609 (1970) and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970) (creating
the Environmental Protection Agency).
14. FLA. STAT. § 718.111(6) (1981).
15. Public health, safety and welfare are valid rulemaking goals in either the administrative or cohdominium context. Compare Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester
Sand 9: Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 222, 334 A.2d 514, 522 (1975) (administrative context)
with Hidden Harbour Estates v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 181 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1975) (condominium context).
16. See D. WOLFE, CONDOMINIUM AND HomEowNa AssoCIATIONS THAT WORK 88-84 (1978)

(condominium associations should pattern their decisionmaking procedures after public
agencies). Condominium rules substantively impact upon all aspects of unit owners' lives.
See Mavrakis v. Plaza del Sol Ass'n, Inc., No. 77-6049-CIV-WMH

(S.D. Fla. May 11, 1978)

(visitor limitation); White Egret Condominium Ass'n v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979)
(prohibiting children); Wilshire Condominium Ass'n v. Kohlbrand, 368 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla.

4th D.C.A. 1979) (prohibition against pet replacement); Plaza Del Prado Condominium
Ass'n v. Richman, 345 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977) (architectural restriction); Hidden
Harbour Estates v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1975) (alcohol ban). See also
Mandelkorn, Condominium Litigation, 33 U. MIAMI L. Ray. 911, 943-44 (1979); Miami

Herald, Aug. 19, 1981, § B1, at 1, col. 5.
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The federal Administrative Procedure Act imposes procedural requirements and substantive limitations on administrative agency action. The Act
empowers courts to invalidate an agency's informal rulemaking if procedural
safeguards were not followed' s and requires courts to invalidate any action
which reflects an arbitrary or capricious abuse of administrative discretion.' 9
Generally, actions violative of a federal constitutional right or unrelated to a
20
legitimate governmental purpose constitute abuse.
When reviewing an alleged abuse, courts presume the administrative action
is reasonable. 2 1 Because of this presumption, the rule challenger traditionally
2
bears the burden of proving the agency reached an unreasonable decision.
Agencies, however, must meet certain burdens, too. Innovative courts increasingly command agencies to produce coherent, reviewable records of the
administrative decisionmaking process.' 3
17. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-06 (1976).
18. Id .§ 706(2)(D).
19. Id. § 706(2)(A) (applies to both formal and informal administrative proceedings).
Besides the requirement that administrative actions be neither arbitrary nor capricious, the
Act requires that formal findings be supported by "substantial evidence." Id. § 706(2)(E).
Under rigorous standards of substantive judicial review, however, the "arbitrary or capricious"
and "substantial evidence" standards are often indistinguishable. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 564,
95th Cong., Ist Sess. 178 (1977) (citing Associated Indus. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d
342 (2d Cir. 1973)) [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT 1977].
20. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971); 1 F.
CooPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW 91

(1965);

1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE

§ 8:15 (2d ed. 1978). See generally, Gellhorn & Robinson, Rulemaking "Due Process": An
Inconclusive Dialogue, 48 U. Cm. L. REv. 201 (1981).
21. See, e.g., Bowman Transp. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 290 (1974);
Ethyl Oil Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
Compare Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e)(2)(A), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976) (reviewing
court shall set aside agency action found, inter alia, to be arbitrary or capricious) with Wright,
The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of JudicialReview, 59 CORNELL L. REV.
375, 391 (1974) ("the converse of arbitrariness and caprice is rationality").
22. See Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562 F.2d 701, 717 n.38 (D.C. Cir. 1977); MarylandNational Capital Park & Plan. Comm'n v. Lynn, 514 F.2d 829, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Udall v.
Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co., 398 F.2d 765, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1017 (1969); 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 20, § 6:12, at 497; Gifford, Rulemaking and Rulemaking
Review: Struggling Toward a New Paradigm, 32 AD. L. Rmv. 577, 593-94 & n.84 (1980);
Woodward & Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial Review of Agency Action, 31 AD. L. REV.
329, 343 (1979). See infra note 198 for decisions contra.
23. See Regulation Reform Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 3263 Before the Subcomm.
Ad. Law and Gov'tl. Rel. of the House Jud. Comm., 96th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess., 420, 437-38
(1979-80) (report submitted by the late Harold Leventhal, United States Circuit Judge, District
of Columbia) (discussing the flexibility of judicial review of administrative action) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings 1979]. Courts are increasingly requiring agencies to provide
coherent information to facilitate judicial review. Id. See infra notes Ill & 198 for supportive
cases. This rigorous judicial review of administrative decisions has been labeled the "hard
look" standard. See National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Originally
the phrase "hard look," described the agency's duty to scrutinize the evidence before it. See
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
923 (1971); House Hearings 1979, supra, at 428. As agencies' rulemaking records increasingly
reflected less extensive procedures, the phrase evolved to connote rigorous judicial scrutiny
of informal rulemaking proceedings. See, e.g., Maryland-National Capital Park & Plan.
Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1037-38 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Kennecott
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Florida courts have adopted an analogous standard of reasonableness for
review of condominium rulemaking. The source of the rule, however, deter-

mines the degiee of scrutiny given the rulemaking under the reasonableness
standard. If-the condominium association promulgated the challenged regulation, then the Florida courts, like their' federal counterparts, defer to the
rulemaker's judgment. 24 If the developer promulgated the rule in the declaration of condominium, however, Florida courts establish a strong presumption
of validity which exceeds federal administrative law standards and uphold

even unreasonable rules. 25 This greater deference to declaration rules reflects
their relatively permanent and general 'application,26 while rules adopted by
27
the condominium association are usually operational and subject to change.
After examining the practical effects of judicial deference to condominium

rulemakers, this note will explore whether Florida's standard requires procedural or substantive review of condominium rulemaking.-

The current

Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 849-50 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (court must develop adequate
record to' facilitate judicial review). See also K. DAVIS, ADMINiSTanTvE LA-w OF rH SEVEMTIS
§ 29.01-.06 (1976); Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing Variations
and Standards of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act and Other Federal
Statutes, 75 COLum. L. REv. 721, 746-70 (1975); Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution
of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L. Rev. 1805, 1812-13 (1978).
24. Compare Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, 393 So. .2d 637, 639-40 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.
1981) (association rules and declaration rules as applied by the board of directors must
be reasonable and quoting Hidden Harbour Estates v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. 4th
D.C.A. 1975) (holding that "if a rule is reasonable the association can adopt it; if not, it
cannot")) with House Hearings 1979, supra note 23, at 431-32 (suggesting that the overall
test of administrative action, despite claims that courts give "great deference" to agencies,
is reasonableness). See also Lyons v. King, 397 So. 2d 964, 969 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1981) (Hurley
J., dissenting) (both rules adopted by condominium association and action by the board
of directors pursuant to power conferred in the Declaration of Condominium must be
reasonable); Juno By the Sea N. Condominium v. Manfredonia, 397 So. 2d 297, 302 (Fla.
4th D.C.A. 1981) (on rehearing) (requiring the association's regulation of common elements
to be reasonable).
25. Compare Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 639-40 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.
1981) (asserting that declaration rules are "clothed with a very strong presumption of
validity;" reasonableness "is not the appropriate test") and Sterling Village Condominium
v. Brietenbach, 251 So. 2d 685, 688 (holding that structural unit changes in violation of
declaration rules, no matter how laudable, are not permitted) with Zuber v. Allen, 296 U.S.
168, 192 (noting that federal courts avoid giving conclusive effect to an agency's construction
of enabling legislation because agency's view "is only one input in the interpretational
equation") and Wordward & Levin, supra note 22, at 332 (presumption of correctness surrounding agency action "is most definitely rebuttable").
26. See supra note 4.
27. For sample rule, see Fla. B. Continuing Legal Educ., 2 FLA. REAL PROP,. PRAc. 710
(1975); R. BoYRn, supra note 5, at F-135.
28. Increased substantive review of administrative records has generated confusion over
the applicable standard of review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See
Auerbach, Informal Rulemaking: A Proposed Relationship Between Administrative Procedures
and Judicial Review, 72 Nw. U.L. Rev. 15 (1977); Delong, Informal Rulemaking and the
Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA. L. REV. 257, 284-89 (1979); Pedersen, Formal Records
and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE .J. 38, 46-50 (1975). By disallowing judicially imposed
administrative procedures beyond the APA's requirements, the Supreme Court somewhat
mooted the debate between substantive and procedural review advocates. Seg Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 US. 519,
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advocates of procedural review in administrative law insist that the decisionmakers' rigorous compliance with rulemaking procedures will ensure reasonable results.2 9 A growing number of critics maintains, however, that reasonable
rulemaking will prevail only if courts go beyond procedural analysis and substantively evaluate agency action.3 0 This note will suggest that condominium
rulemaking lacks the theoretical justification that underpins deferential procedural review of administrative rulemaking. Functional criteria for substantive review are necessary. The note will also analyze the functional advantages of adopting administrative law innovations regarding the presumption
of validity and the burdens of proof and persuasion.
THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY AND BURDEN OF
PERSUASION - AN INADEQUATE CHECYK ON
CONDOMINIUM RULEMAKING

By creating a strong presumption that declaration rules are valid and
placing the burden of persuasion on the challengers of association rules, Florida
524 (1978). See generally Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Court's Role in the Nuclear
Energy Controversy, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (1978); Byse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution
of Administrative Procedure:A Somewhat Different View, 91 HARV. L. Rlv. 1823 (1978). But
see McGowan, Reflections on Rulemaking Review, 53 TuLANE L. REv. 681, 694-95 (1979)
(supporting procedural review); Rodgers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental
Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GFo. L.J. 699, 708 (1979) (advocating substantive review);
Note, Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 14 GA. L. REv. 300, 307 (1980) (because APA
has specific procedural review provisions, "arbitrary or capricious" standard calls for substantive review). See also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976) (procedural review); id. § 706(2)(D)
("arbitrary or capricious" standard).
29. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, C. J., concurring); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelhaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Bazelon, C. J., concurring); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d
,584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See generally Bazelon, The Impact of the Courts on Public Administration,52 IND. L.J. 101 (1976).
30. The United States District Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is the
most active forum for the debate over procedural or substantive judicial review. Approximately two-thirds of the cases heard by the court arc appeals from administrative actions,
and the percentage is likely to increase. See Bazelon, supra note 29, at 106-07; Leventhal,
Appellate Procedures:Design, Patchwork and Managed Flexibility, 23 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 432, 437
(1976). But see Wall St. J., March 18, 1982, at 29, col. 6 (number of appeals of federal regulatory agency decisions filed with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has declined
precipitously to the current 35 per month from 69 a month in early 1981). Of the fourteen
judges on the District of Columbia Circuit, two senior judges strongly support the procedural approach. See Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62
CORNELL L. REv. 817, 822-24 & n.19 (1977); McGowan, supra note 28, at 685-89. Six judges
(have shown some support for substantive review. See National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 14 627
F.2d 416, 451-55 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Wald, J.); Natural Resources Defense Council v. United
States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 658-61 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Tamm, J., concurring), rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978); American Paper Inst. v. Train, 543 F.2d 328, 356 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (Robb, J.); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 70 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (MacKinnon,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); 541 F.2d at 97-100 (Wilkey, J., dissenting);
Wright, supra note 21, at 390. See also Oakes, Substantive Judicial Review in Environmental
Law, 7 ENVIR. L. REP. 50029, 50030 (1977); Leventhal, Environmental Decisions and the Role
of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509, 511 (1974).
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courts have limited substantive judicial review of condominium rulemaking.
Florida decisions have recognized, however, that the condominium's conceptual complexity precludes conventional contract analysis. 31 Although condominium ownership involves a contractual relationship, more than a mere
contract results from unit owners' abstract exchange of individual rights and
privileges for the collective security and safety of condominium living. The
exchange resembles the formation of a private government.L3 2 Additionally,
because the condominium association is statutorily mandated- a and judicial
enforcement of its covenants triggers state action,3 4 condominiums possess significant public aspects. Consequently, condominium rulemaking must comport
with constitutional due process and equal protection requirements.- Nevertheless, Florida's limited equitable review of condominium rulemaking has consistently upheld stricter use restrictions on condominiums than on more traditional forms of property ownership.86

31. See, e.g., Pepe v. Whispering Sands Condominium Ass'n, 351 So. 2d 755, 757 (Fla. 2d
D.C.A. 1977). See Note, supra note 10, at 660 n.64. Cf. Candib v. Carver, 344 So. 2d 1312, 131415 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977) (suit between unit owners to enforce noise restriction).
32. See Hidden Harbour Estates v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1975)
(unit owners living close to one another in a "little democratic sub society" necessarily sacrifice
a certain degree of freedom). Courts have explicitly invoked Lockean theory to justify the
condominium rulemakers' exercise of authority. Compare Sterling Village Condominium, Inc.
v. Breitenbach, 251 So. 2d 685, 688 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1971) (common ownership tempers
free use of property) with J. Locas, Two TaRATiSEs OF GovERNmENT §§ 95, 99 (T. Cooke ed.
1947) (social contract theory). See also Poliakoff, supra note 2, at 757.
33. FLA. STAT. §§ 718.103(2), .111(1) (1981).
34. Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, 358 So. -2d 1084, 1089 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1978),
af'd on other grounds, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979). See Mandelkorn, supra note 17, at 911 &
n.170. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1948) (judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants triggers state action).
35. See White Egret Condominium v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346, 349-52 (Fla. 1979) (equal
protection); Hyatt, Condominium and Homeowner Associations: Formation and Develop-

ment, 24 EMtoRY LJ. 977, 982-84 (1975) (due process and equal protection principles). Cf.
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (privately owned development subject to
constitutional restraints); Walter, Condominium Government: How Should the Laws be,

Changed?, 4 REAL Er. L.J. 141, 143-46 (1975) (condominium voting should follow a one
unit one vote scheme); Note, New Community Development, 11 WAsHBURN L.J. 227, 236
(1972) (must review restrictive covenants which implicate constitutional scrutiny; Comment,
Democracy in the New Towns: The Limits of Private Government, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 379,
403-07, 410 (1969). But see Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory

Survey, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 253, 276-77 (1976) (residents' consent to restrictions undermines
right to constitutional protections); Note, supra note 10, at 663 (consent must be a factor in
the constitutional analysis of condominium restrictions); Comment, State Action in Private
Condominiums (1980) (unpublished, student work on file in the University of Florida Law
Review offce) (discussing consent). See generally, Poliakoff, The Role of the Association in

Condominium Operations, 55 FLA. B.J. 111 (1981).
36. See Chianese v. Culley, 397 F. Supp. 1344, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Seagate Condominium
Ass'n v. Duffy, 330 So. 2d 484, 486 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1976). Some authorities have criticized
Florida's conservative approach to all types of land restraints and have advocated balancing
social policies to determine the validity of land use agreements. See 2 P. RoHAN & M. RESKIN,
CONDOMINiU
LAW AND PRAcGCE § 10.32[2] (lst ed. 1975); RESrATEMENT or PROPERTY § 563

(1944).
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The Presumptionof Validity Surrounding
DeclarationRules Unduly Prejudicesthe
DeclarationRule Challenger
The judicial deference accorded rules stated in the declaration of condominium facilitates finding that the rulemaker has acted within its powers.
Rule challengers must demonstrate the developer abused his rulemaking
discretion. Despite this presumptive validity, the Florida Supreme Court in
White Egret Condominium v. Franklins 7 invalidated an age restriction contained in the condominium's declaration. Although the age restriction prohibited unit occupancy by children under twelve years, many unit owners
had young children. When a unit owner transferred his unit to his brother, the
condominium association attempted to invalidate the transfer because the
transferee's children were too young.38
The White Egret court acknowledged the constitutionality of age restrictions
as reasonable categorizations of the population's housing preferences. The
unanimous court found that. use restrictions are a necessity in condominium
complexes and declaration rules underlie an agreement entered into by all
condominium unit owners for their protection.3 9 The court stressed that a
condominium's social complexity requires the owner's actual or constructive
knowledge of declaration rules to constitute his consent to reasonable regulations.4 0 Recognizing that judicial enforcement of a restrictive covenant invokes the state's sovereign powers, 41 however, the court applied an equal protection analysis to the White Egret association's enforcement of the regulation.
The court found the association's uneven enforcement of the age restriction
a denial of equal protection. Hence, a due process or equal protection
challenge to the declaration restriction required the court to evaluate the restriction's reasonableness under the circumstances and to4 2invalidate the association's arbitrary and oppressive application of the rule.
Superficially, the court's reasonableness requirement appears to obliterate
a declaration' rule's preferred status over association rules. 4 3 Reasonableness,
however, merely represents one facet of the court's inquiry.44 The standard
37. 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 350. See Comment, Real Property: Constitutionality of Condominium Use and
Occupancy Restrictions, 7 STETSON .NTRA. L. REV. 193, 202 n.62 (1978). See also supra note 32.
40. 379 So. 2d at 350. See supra note 25 for cases in accord. See also FtA. STAT. § 718.104(2)
(1981) (requiring developer to record declaration at local land registry); 1976 House Hearings,
supra note 2, at 313-14 (statements of Mr. Joseph Paglino, Florida condominium attorney)
(discussing the injustice of constructive notice).
41. Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1084, 1089 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.
1978), afJ'd, 379 So. 2d 46 (1979). See Mandelkorn, supra note 17, at 946-47 (discussing
the appellate court decision).
42. 379 So. 2d at 351.
43. See supra notes 24 & 25 and accompanying text.
44. See Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 640 (Fla. 4th D.CA. 1981)
(citing White Egret); Scavo, supra note 12, at 326; Note, supra note 10, at 662. But see
Coquina Club, Inc. v. Mantz, 342 So. 2d 112, 114, n.4 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1977) (upholding age
restriction under facts similar to those in White Egret).
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invalidates only rules that are applied so unreasonably. that they violate
constitutional rights." Unless the challenge to the rule implicates constitutional due process or equal protection principles, Florida courts maintain that
the information buyers receive from the publicly recorded declaration and
the full disclosure statement provides adequate protection from unreasonable
rulemaking.4 Because the buyer has notice of the restriction, even unreasonable declaration rules may be afforded a strong presumption of validity.47 For
example, a unit owner may wish to replace metal porch screens with expensive
glass jalousies, but an architectural restriction against material structural
alterations could prevent this change.48 Although a rule may preclude laudable
improvements, it will not be invalidated unless it is arbitrarily enforced in
violation of public policy or a constitutional right, as in White Egret.4 9
Because most buyers ignore or misunderstand disclosure statements, a presumption of validity based on the unit owners' knowledge of declaration rules
rests on a practical fiction. 50 Thus, condominium buyers are inadequately
45.

379 So. 2d at 348. The court implied that the rule also must relate to a legitimate

purpose. Id. at 351. See Note, supra note 10, at 663 (the Florida courts' definition of purpose
is too easily satisfied). See also Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. 223, 228, 526 P.2d 747, 752 (1974)
(relied on by White Egret); Comment, JudicialEnforcement of Restrictive Covenants Against
Children: An Equal Protection Analysis, 17 A~iz. L. Rnv. 717 (1975) (discussing Riley v.
Stoves, 22 Ariz. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974)).
46. See Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 638, 639-40 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1981).
47. Tld. at 640 (attaching great weight to the right of the developer and other unit
owners to rely on enforcement of rules in the declaration). The Florida courts base their
deference to declaration rules on more than the constructive notice provided by registration
of the declaration at the local land registry. See FA. STAT. §§ 718.503-.504 (1979) (requiring
developer to include restrictions and covenants effecting owners' property use in disclosure
statement); FLA. AD. CoDE 7D-17.04 to .07 (requiring updated disclosure statement). Cf. ALA.
CoDE §§ 35-8-7, -8(a), -11 (1981) (no disclosure required beyond registration); Amuz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 33-552 (West 1981) (same); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 183A, § 9 (West 1981)
(same); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1301a, §§ 3, 7 (Vernon 1981) (same). See also K.
Ro.NEy, supra note 5, § 14.03 (general real estate disclosure requirements are applicable
to condominiums); Pohoryles, Condo Regulation on the Local Level, 1975 REAL Esr. REv. 18
(municipalities).
48. See Sterling Village Condominium, Inc. v. Breitenbach, 251 So. 2d 685, 688 (Fla. 4th
D.C.A. 1971). See also J. VAN DOREN, supra note 4, at 28 (Sterling decision was based on a

petty concern for uniformity).
49. See Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 638, 640 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1981) (citing
White Egret). Courts have indicated that White Egret's proscription of arbitrary rule enforcement means that, although declaration rules are presumed valid, any board action
pursuant to that rule is subject to the reasonableness test established in Hidden Harbou
Estates v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1975) for association rulemaking. Lyons
v. King, 397 So. 2d 964, 968-69 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1981.) (Hurley, J., dissenting); 393 So. 2d at
637, 639.
50. See Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 282 (testimony of James L. Laughlin, Vice
President, Community Associations Institute) (few owners read disclosure statements). Cf.
1976 House Hearings,supra note 2, at 94 (testimony of Benjamin Rosenthal, N.Y. State Rep.)
(virtually no one reads the documents filed with the county clerk). The United States
Supreme Court long ago indicated in reference to notice that "great caution should be used
rot to let fiction deny the fair play than can be secured only by a pretty close adhesio to
fact." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 320 (denying jurisdiction
based on published notice) (quoting McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1916)).
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protected from rulemaking authority which is subject to only limited statutory
substantive controls.51 Often ignorant of the condominium's conceptual complexity, laypersons generally do not expect such rulemaking authority to
exist.52 They therefore often forego an attorney's assistance 53 and make quick
decisions in a seller's market without comprehending their legal commitments. 54 Other voluminous documents incorporated by reference into the dis-

closure statement further burden the buyer.55 Even trained lawyers find the
documents inordinately difficult to understand5 6
Disclosure requirements have given buyers valuable investment information
and have discouraged many self-serving developers, but most buyers remain
uninformed about condominium rules and rulemaking authority. 57 The Florida
51.

See Wenig & Schulz, Government Regulation of Condominiums in California, 14
(1963); Note, Florida Condominiums-Developer Abuses and Securities Laws Implications Create a Need for a State Regulatory Agency, 25 U. FLA. L. REV.
350, 365 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Developer Abuses]. The documents' length and complexity combined with buyers' distaste for fine print discourages inspection. See Rohan, The
"Model Condominium Code"-A Blue Print for Modernizing Condominium Legislation, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 587, 589 & n.13 (1978); Note, Recent Innovations in State Condominium
Legislation, 48 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 994, 1004 (1974).
52. See 1976 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 195 (testimony of Carla Hills) (shared
ownership, close living quarters, divergent interests of owners, and participation in condominium government befuddled many inexperienced owners). See also Note, Condominium
Regulation: Beyond Disclosure, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 665-69 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Beyond Disclosure]; Note, Promulgation and Enforcement of House Rules, 48 ST. JOHN's L.
Rtv. 1132, 1132 (1974) [hereinafter cited as House Rules].
53. See Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 287 (testimony of James L. Laughlin); Note,
To Tell the Truth, the Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth -Help for Florida's
Frazzled Condominium Buyers?, 8 U. MICim. J.L. REF. 387, 399 (1975) (unlike regulations for
securities prospecti, there is no requirement that condominium disclosure statements receive
professional screening).
54. See 1976 House Hearings,supra note 2, at 97 (testimony of Rep. Rosenthal) (buyers,
especially the elderly, will sacrifice their legal rights to live near friends or family); H. ROTHFENBERG, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT A CONDOMINIUM 69-70 (1974) (quoting from CAL.
DEP'T OF REAL EST., CONDOMINIUM SURVEY
(1973)) (most buyers based their decision to
purchase on location and cost oi:the condominium without comprehending the difficulties
of shared ownership). See also 1976 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 300 (testimony of
Ignatz Spitz, Florida condominium unit owner) (buyer was told that he had thirty minutes
or less to inspect apartment and read legal documents before some one else would buy the
unit).
55. See 1976 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 94 (statements of Rep. Rosenthal) (in
Florida, 100 to 150 page agreements were sometimes filed with a county clerk and incorporated
by reference into the contract for sale).
56. Id.; Note, supra note 53, at 396-97. But see Developer Abuses, supra note 51, at 539 &
n.64 (a trained lawyer can easily comprehend the terms in condominium documents).
57. Note, supra note 10, at 650 (canvassing nationwide statutory shortcomings). See FLA.
STAT. §§ 718.503-.504 (1981) (disclosure); id. §§ 718.202-.203 (escrow and warranties); id.
§ 718.503(l)(a) (cancellation right). Because substantive controls are largely unrelated to rulemaking, the Florida statutes protect unit purchasers from unreasonable restrictions only by
providing them with "an adequate basis upon which to found their judgment." See Note,
supra note 53, at 399. See also SEC, REPORT OF THE SEC REAL ESTATE ADVIsORY CoMMrrrEE 4
(1972) (discussing condominium regulation) (economic disclosures best protect investors in
real estate securities). The focus of federal regulation on investment rather than on intelligent
housing decisions provides no additional protection from rulemaking abuses in Florida. See
HASTINGS L.J. 222, 238
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statute requires "conspicuous" disclosure of recreation leases, 5 buyers' cancellation rights,5 9 and the need for a writing to bind developers. 0 No such conspicuous information about rules and rulemaking is required, however. The
statute permits developers to reveal their restrictions and to disclose the condominium association's rulemaking power in documents appended to the
voluminous disclosure statement. 61 The buyer is further disadvantaged because
the statement's sheer length discourages careful scrutiny. 62 Furthermore, developers often fail to include statutorily required information in the statement.

63

The few extra-judicial substantive controls on condominium rulemaking in
Florida do not adequately compensate for these failures to disclose. For example,
the sole substantive statutory restriction on rulemaking ignores declaration
rules but requires association rules to be "reasonable." 64 Furthermore, neither
the state regulatory agency nor the local land registries assess the submitted
documents' overall fairness.- In practice, therefore, the strong presumption of
validity afforded declaration rules insulates them from substantive review and

thereby expands developers' rulemaking powers at the expense of aggrieved
rule challengers. 66 Such broad power is inconsistent with the trend toward
substantive condominium regulation- and unduly confines the courts' tendency

to construe a declaration's ambiguities against the developer. 68
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1980) (resort condominiums and rental arrangements); the Interstate Land Sales Disclosure Act, id. §§ 1701-20 (1980) (interstate solicitation
of developments); 24 C.F.R. §§ 1710.1(i)-.5 (1980). See also SEC Securities Act Release No.
5347, reprinted in FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1049 (Jan. 4, 1973) (listing factors for determining
whether condominium sales qualify as a securities offering); Dickey & Thorpe, Federal Securities Regulation of Condominium Offerings, 19 N.Y.L.F. 473 (1974); Note, Federal Securities
Regulation of Condominiums: A Purchaser'sPerspective, 62 GEO. L. J. 1403 (1974).
58. FLA. STAT. § 719.504(8) (1979).
59. Id. § 719.503(1)(a):
60. Id. § 718.504(1)(b).
61. Id. § 718.504(23)(a), (c).
62. See supra note 51.
63. See Mayberry, The Bureau of Condominiums -Its Functions and Goals, 55 FLA. B.J.
139, 142 (1981> (bureau detects numerous disclosure violations when reviewing statements).
See also 3 FLA. AD. CODE 7D-17.04 (filing does not constitute administrative approval of
contents).
64. FLA. STAT. § 718.123(1) (1981). Other states have similar rulemaking restrictions.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-8-9(3) (1981); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1355(c) (West Supp. 1981); MICi.
STAT. ANN. § 26.50 (1946) (Supp. 1981); MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-9-17 (Supp. 1981); NEV. RPv. STAT.
§ 117.060 (1979); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 46:8B-13(d) (West Cum. Supp. 1980); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 47-04.1-04 (Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-36-10 (Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-810(1) (Supp. 1981).
65. See 1976 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 320 (statement of Milton Field, Realtor,
N. Miami Beach, Fla.) (county clerk routinely accepts condominium documents without reviewing contents); J. VAN DOREN, supra note 4, at 90 (Florida's regulatory agency does not
assess the documents' fairness).
66. See Reichman, supra note 85, at -274.
67. See supra note 57.
68. See Kaufman v. Shere, 347 So. 2d 627, 628 (Fla. 1977) (in case of ambiguity, the court
will construe the declaration against the developer who authored it); J. VAN DOREN, supra note
4, at 11. Cf. Fountains of Palm Beach Condominium Inc. v. Parkas, 355 So. 2d 163, 164 (Fla.
4th D.C.A. 1978) (court strictly construes the declaration).
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The Burden of Persuasionon AssociationRule
ChallengersSanctionsNondeliberative
Decisionmaking
While declaration rules enjoy an almost conclusive presumption of
validity,69 association rules seem to share the rebuttable presumption of
regularity afforded an administrative agency's informal rules.70 To assess a
rule's validity, a court determines whether the rulemaker acted within its
scope of authority and whether the rule reflects reasoned or arbitrary and
capricious decisionmaking.71 Florida courts require a reasonable relationship
between condominium association rules and the legitimate purposes of the
condominium. 72 In this regard, the reasonableness test resembles White Egret's
constitutional scrutiny of discriminatory rule enforcement 73 and is analogous
to the federal courts' requirement that administrative agency action conform
to relevant substantive law purposes.7 4 Under this analysis, the challenger
must first demonstrate the rule in question is unreasonable. The burden then
5
shifts to the rulemaker to justify its actions.7
The condominium association's bylaws typically enable the board of
directors to tailor condominium operations to the changing needs of their
community. The board establishes and enforces new rules, policies and
architectural controls and interprets or applies existing declaration rules.76
In the leading case applying Florida's reasonableness standard, Hidden
HarbourEstates v. Norman,77 a condominium association's board of directors
adopted a rule prohibiting alcohol use in the condominium's clubhouse. Although the plaintiff unit owners showed that their prior alcohol use had not
caused disorder, the challengers did not meet their burden of proving the
rule unreasonables and a Florida district court of appeal upheld the rule.
The court found that an activity within the condominium complex need
not constitute a nuisance to be subject to regulation.79 The court further
69. See supra note 25.
70. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971). See also
supra note 24.
71. Compare Scavo, supra note 12, at 319-26 (comparing public agencies to condominium
rulemakers) with House Hearings 1979, supra note 23, at 420, 427 (report submitted by Judge
Leventhal) (courts require reasonable administrative decisions within the grant of legislative
power).
72. See Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 638, 640 (1981); Note, supra note
10, at 660-63; Note, Living in a Condominium: Individual Needs v. Community Interests,
46 U. CIN. L. REv. 523, 529-30 (1977).
73. See supra text accompanying note 42.
74. See supra note 12.
75. See Condos in the Courts: A Rundown of Recent Opinions, 3 CoNno REP. 7 (analyzing
Hidden Harbour Estates v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1975)). See also supra note
22 and accompanying text. But see Juno By the Sea N. Condominium v. Manfredonia, 397
So. 2d 297, 304 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1981) (peculiar facts heighten judicial scrutiny).
76. See SUCCESSFUL AssocIATION, supra note 4, at 14.
77. 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1975).
78. Id. at 181. See Condos in the Courts: A Rundown of Recent Opinions, supra note 75,
at 7.
79. 309 So. 2d at 182. But see Baum v, Ryerson Towers, 55 Misc. 2d 1045, 1046, 287
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asserted that the association can adopt any rule that has some relationship
to the unit owners' health, happiness; and enjoyment of life and is not
arbitrary and capricious. The Hidden Harbour court concluded that the facts
of each case will determine whether the association rule at issue meets
the threshold reasonableness test.8 0
The latitude granted condominium associations under the reasonableness
test exists despite the potential that their rulemaking authority will be abused.
The condominium's major decisionmaking responsibility rests with the board
of directors-' In practice, the board tends to assume much greater power and
authority than the legislature, developer or association originally intended.s2
If not checked by the courts, the board can transact all business through
simple resolutions, briefly stated in the minutes, without making a record
of the deliberations.ss When the challenger fails to meet the initial burden,
the rulemaker prevails and the court does not examine the board's decisionmaking process.8 4 The board's potential malice or bad faith toward certain
unit owners makes it essential that judicial review of a rule's reasonableness
be based on consideration of the decisionmaker's deliberations.8 5 Furthermore,
the Florida courts' broad requirement of a proper purpose is too imprecise
to produce consistent judicial review of restrictions on a case by case approach.5 8 Unless courts require rulemakers to reveal the factors, alternatives

N.Y.S.2d 791, 793 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1968) (mem.) (only a "nuisance" or "public disturbance" violates community room usage rule). See also Baum v. Coronado Condominium
Ass'n, 376 So. 2d 914, 918 (Fla. d D.CA. 1979) (enjoining noise constituting nuisance);
Poliakoff, supra note 2, at 759 (discussing nuisance cases).
80. 309 So. 2d at 182. The trial court's requirement that rules "have some reasonable relationship to the protection of life, property, or general welfare" of condominium residents
corresponds to the standard of review for local zoning ordinances and subdivision regulations.
CONDOMINIUM Rm., supra note .2, at 7. See also 1 A. RAPTiow, THE LAW OF ZONING AND
PLANNING § 2.03 (4th ed. 1979); Note, Judicial Review of Zoning Regulations (unpublished
student work on file at the University of Florida Law Review office).
81. See SUCCESSFUL ASSOCIATION, supra note 4, at 14 (discussing a board's typical powers,
such as establishing rules, enforcing architectural restrictions and approving legal action
against recalcitrant owners). See also D. WoLnr, supra note 16, at 98-99 (describing board

meeting procedures).
82. PRACrINCING LAw INsTITUTE, supra note 2, at 22 suggesting an activist on the board
can dominate the association).
83.

See D. WOLFF, supra note 16, at 81.

84. See, e.g., Hidden Harbour Estates v. Norman, 309 So. 2d at 181; Note, supra note 10,
at 666. The Hidden Harbour court's rejection of "arbitrary and capricious rules" unrelated to
the purposes of the condominium resembles equal protection and substantive due process
analysis rather than procedural due process review. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1, 8 (1974) (equal protection); Steigerwalt v. City of St. Petersburg, 316 So. 2d 554, 556
nA (Fla. 1975) (substantive due process). Cf. Holleman v. Mission Trace Homeowners Ass'n,
556 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (procedural review).
85.

See Practicing Law Institute, supra note 2, at 22; Note, supra note 10, at 648

(criticizing Florida decisions for failing to test for rulemakers' bad faith).
86- See Note, supra note 10, at 663 (virtually every restriction will relate to the majority's
health, happiness and enjoyment of life). Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934)
(signalling the demise of economic substantive due process analysis) (any economic policy of

the state promoting public welfare is valid).
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and evidence considered, judicial review under the reasonableness standard is
mere guesswork that sanctions rules that may, in fact, be unreasonable. 87
A recent Florida district court of appeal decision, Juno By the Sea North
Condominium v. Manfredania,5 thoroughly examined the board of directors'
decisionmaking process under Hidden Harbour'sreasonableness test. In Juno,
twenty unit owners had purchased assigned parking in the condominium's
covered lot, but some of these purchasers continued to use uncovered spaces
intended for the remaining residents. To relieve parking congestion, the
board restricted the appellees and others with exclusive covered parking to
their reserved spaces.8 9 Finding it proper for the directors to note that the
appellees had procured covered parking, the court held that allocation of free,
uncovered parking exclusively to the remaining unit owners was reasonable. 90
The court decided that the board's assignment of the free uncovered spaces
only to nonpurchasers of reserved parking was fairly compensated for by the
maintenance assessments such persons were required to pay toward the
covered lot.91 This compromise averted a potentially discriminatory parking
arrangement. 92 Even if the balance now tipped in the nonpurchasers' favor,
the rule's burdensome effect was mitigated by the appellees' presale notice
93
of the association's rulemaking power.
In Juno the court analyzed the rule's substantive impact to find that the
parking solution was nondiscriminatory. The analysis in Juno satisfied Hidden
Harbour'ssubstantive due process concern that the rule relate to a legitimate
purpose 94 and White Egret's equal protection requirement that the rule's enforcement be nonarbitrary. 915 By ensuring that the board considered relevant
factors, the court also undertook a procedural due process inquiry into the
directors' decisionmaking process. 9 6 Noting that the peculiar facts of the case
87. See Ethyl Coru. v. EPA, 5471 F.2d I, 36 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Wright, J.), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 941 (1976) (court must review all evidence relied upon and discarded by the agency,
as well as the questions addressed and those bypassed).
88. 397 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1981).
89. Id. at 301-02.
90. Id. at 304.
91. Id. at 301. The covered parking lot qualified as a limited common element. See FLA.
STAT. § 718.111 (1981); id. § 718.111(6) (empowering association to maintain common elements
and to assess each unit the amount of money necessary for such maintenance).
92. 397 So. 2d at 304. See Note, supra note 10, at 658-59 (reasonableness review resembles
a court's equitable balancing of competing interests when enforcing land use agreements).
See supra note 36 for a less flexible judicial approach.
93. 397 So. 2d at 304 (citing Point E. Management Corp. v. Point E. One Condominium
Corp., 282 So. 2d 628, 630 (Fla. 1973) (buyer's actual or contructive knowledge that nonnegotiable management contract was part of the condominium purchase price evicerated any
hardship the contract caused present owners)).
94. 397 So. 2d at 303 (quoting Hidden Harbour Estates v. Norman, 309 So. 2d at 182). See
supra notes 80 & 84.
95. 397 So. 2d at 304. See supra text accompanying note 40.
96. Compare 397 So. 2d at 304 (in devising its plan the board properly considered that 20
unit owners had already secured parking) with Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (the action of the agency is invalid unless "the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors"). See also L. JAFFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINSMTATIV
AcnO- 182 (1965).
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increased the potential for arbitrary rulemaking, the court probed further
and determined whether the inferences the board drew were reasonable. This
increased judicial scrutiny under Juno's expanded substantive analysis should
be applied in future cases to promote reasonable rulemaking and principled
judicial review.97
The Juno court's examination of the rule's substantive impact, the procedural soundness of the rulemaking process, and the substantive reasonableness
of the board's logical inferences, provides a potential model for thorough
condominium rulemaking review. The court's deference to the appellees'
notice of the board's rulemaking power, however, undermines its procedural
review. 98 The court ignored the importance of providing affected parties with
an opportunity to comment on proposed rules. 9 The notice received by condominium buyers is too removed from the board's activity to provide unit
00
purchasers a reasonable opportunity to influence the rulemaking process..
Furthermore, the court's suggestion that such procedural notice mitigates the
rule's substantive unreasonableness places a heavier burden of proof on the
rule challenger. By allowing notice of declaration rules to affect association
rulemaking review, the court has theoretically increased judicial deference to
association rulemakers beyond the federal administrative law standards. 10' The
theoretical basis which supports judicial deference to administrative agency
action, however, fails to justify the presumption of validity afforded to

97. 397 So. -d at 304-05. See supra notes 23 & 28 and accompanying text. Substantive
analysis of rulemaking is distinguishable from Hidden Harbour's substantive evaluation of a
rule. The latter standard focuses on the reasonableness of a rule's impact on interested parties
while the former evaluates the reasonableness of the decisionmaker's inferences in light of all
available evidence. See Note, supra note 28, at 308. Substantive due process analysis of the
rulemaking process could lead to questionable decisions like those that characterized the
Supreme Court's substantive due process era. Compare Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)
(despite its interference with free market, economic regulation upheld because it promotes
laudable social goal> with Hidden Harbour Estates v. Norman, 809 So. 2d at 182 (despite no
showing of nuisance, alcohol ban upheld as promoting unit owners' use and enjoyment of the
condominium). See also NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-804(3) (1980) (prohibiting immoral or abnormal
conduct in condonimiums).
98. See 397 So. 2d at 304.
99. See K. DAvis, ADmN- TATrvE LAw TEXT 166 (3d ed. 1972). "Rulemaking procedure
which allows all interested parties to participate is democratic procedure." Id. at 142. But see
Pfizer, Inc. v. Richardson, 434 F.2d 536, 543 (2d Cir. 1970) (trial-type hearing not required).
100. See D. WOLFE, supra note 17, at 83-84 (the board should actively solicit community
participation in policy formulation). Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976) (agency must publish proposed
rule in Federal Register 30 days before effective date to invite comment); Fla. Stat. § 607.084(4)
(1981) (notice to shareholders must be given not more than 60 days before a special meeting).
See also National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (even if rule
challenger did not take advantage of opportunity to comment, rulemaker has affirmative
burden to support its rule).
101. Compare 397 So. 2d at 304 (notice of association's rulemaking power alleviates
owners' hardship) with Hidden Harbour Estates v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 638, 640 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.
1981) (buyer's notice of even unreasonable rules is proof of the rule's validity). But cf.
Flamingo Ranch Estates, Inc. v. Sunshine Ranches Homeowners, Inc., 303 So. 2d 665, 666
(Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1974) (reasonableness requirement read into clause in restrictive covenant
reserving to the developer the right to alter, amend, repeal or modify restrictions).
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declaration rules or the placement of an initial burden of persuasion on rule
102
challengers.
THE MovE TOWARD PROCEDURAL REVIEW: JUDICIAL
DEFERENCE WITHOUT THEORETICAL SUPPORT

The primary justification for the judicial deference given to administrative
action is the agency's presumably superior knowledge and familiarity with
its statutorily delineated field.'10 Theoretically, frequent contact with relevant
substantive law and daily immersion in administrative operations develops
the agency's intellectual and practical expertise.104 Courts consider, at least
subtly, the particular agency's quality, the trustworthiness of its personnel, the
reliability of its prevailing policies, and its overall functional expertise. 105 If
the agency's performance impresses the court, judicial judgment will not be
substituted for that of the agency.' 0 6 Furthermore, because administrators are
public officers, the court will presume official administrative duties were
10 7
properly discharged in the absence of clearly contrary evidence.
Judicial review of scientific agency action demonstrates that the degree of
deference turns on the expertise of the agency involved. 0 8 Before Congress expressly approved rigorous judicial review of agency action in scientifically

102. See Woodward & Levin, supra note 22, at 332-36 (discussing historical justification for
judicial deference). See generally L. JAFFEE, supra note 96.
103. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 866 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 197 (1973).
104. See NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349 (1953). The courts' concern
with the relative qualifications of court and agency clearly demonstrates the impact of agency
expertise on judicial review. Courts most commonly defer to agency decisions in technical
areas. See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 134 & n.25 (1977)
(Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976)). Recognizing the complexity of scientific decisionmaking, commentators have suggested that agencies
submit questions in highly technical areas to a proposed "science court." The agency would
then promulgate rules based on the science court's findings and its own policy considerations.
See Markey, A Forum for Technocracy: A Report on the Science Court's Proposal, 60 JuoICATuRE 364 (1977); Martin, The Proposed "Science Court", 75 MicH. L. REv. 1058 (1977); Task
Force of the PresidentialAdvisory Group on Anticipated Advances in Science and Technology,
The Science Court Experiment: An Interim Report, 193 SCIENCE 653 (1976). When the subject
matter relates to common law doctrines, the Constitution, or judicial precedent, the competence of the judiciary is given greater influence. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1,
41 n.27 (1977) (implied cause of action from statutory interpretation); Texas Gas Transmission
Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 363 U.S. 263, 268-70 (1960) (applying common law rules of contract
construction); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 89 (1943) (decision based on judicially
created equitable principles).
105. See House Hearings 1979 supra note 23, at 436 (Judge Leventhal) (agency's experience guides the court); K. DAVIs, supra note 99, at 552-53 & n.8.
106. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Sandbank,, 403 F.2d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 961 (1969). See also K. DAVIS, supra note 99, at 232.
108. See Bazelon, supra note 29, at 107 (agencies are more competent than courts to resolve
factual disputes and make value judgments in scientifically complex fields). See supra note 18
for areas of administrative expertise.
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complex areas,10 9 courts had already adopted a "hard look" review standard.'
For instance, the courts required that agencies account for test variables, ascertain whether test conditions were representative of usual circumstances,
assure test validity, and determine the statistical significance of results. As a
preliminary requirement, cooperative agencies provided sufficient data to
demonstrate systematic problem solving. l
In stark contrast to the empirical objectivity of rules written by administrative experts, self-interest or inexperience is usually reflected in the rules condominium developers write. Declaration rules are often the product of the
developers' subjective value judgments rather than any bona fide business
practice or procedure. 1 2 At worst; the declaration rulemaking process is a
collusive effort between the developer, its designated management corporation
and the condominium association designed to benefit the developer and its
designees."13 At best, the rules reflect a concerted effort by the developer and a
knowledgeable attorney to meet the development's specific operational needs."The United States Supreme Court has justified its deference to agency
action based on the agency's cumulative experience and understanding of
the subject matter." s A national condominium study by the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development"16 recently found, however,
that many problems related to condominium formation resulted from the
developer's lack of experience. For example, the conceptual complexity of
condominium property ownership often overwhelms developers3r 7 Furthermore, the financial attractiveness of the condominium market often causes
developers to overextend themselves."" Although the initial boom of the
109. See HousE REPORT 1977, supra note 19, at 178, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATivE HISTORY 558
(enacting the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (Supp. I 1977) ("arbitrary
and capricious" standard requires thorough comprehensive review)).
110. See supra note 23.
111. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (agency cannot expect court
to gather together scattered information to make a coherent whole); National Lime Ass'n
v. EPA, 697 F.2d 416, 454-55 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (assumptions and reasons for discarding probative data must be stated); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (agency
must produce coherent, organized record and succinct explanatory statement); Ethyl Corp. v.
EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 104 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (agency decision must be explained, not merely explainable); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (data
and findings relied upon should be revealed). See also Gifford, supra note 22, at 613-17
(suggesting additional burdens appropriate for agencies).
112. See 1976 House Hearings, supranote 2, at 313 (testimony of Joseph Pagliano, Florida
Condominium attorney) (because the developer chooses its management corporation' and
selects the initial board of directors, the documents produced are not the result of arms-length

transactions).
113. See, e.g., UNITE-D STATES DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEv., SUGGESTED LEGAL
DOCUMENTS FOR PLANNEuUNIT DEv. (1973) (FHA form 1400, VA form 26-8200).
114. DEvELoPER's ROLE, supra note 4, at 31 (discussing rulemaking guidelines).
116. NLRB v! Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349 (1953).
116. See HUD Study, supra note 1.
117. See 1976 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 184-85 (excerpts from the HUD Study,
supra note 1, submitted by Secretary Carla Hills). See supra note 52 for factors contributing to
complexity.,
118. 1976 House Hearings,supra note 2, at 96 (testimony of Rep. Rosenthal) (referring
to Florida condominiums).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1982

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 3
UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXIV

1970's has subsided, the recent condominium conversion upsurge has revived
these dangers. 19
When the developer incorporates presale association rules into the declaration by reference, the expertise justification for limited judicial review of
condominium rulemaking is implausible. Before selling any units, the developer forms the condominium association's initial board of directors, which
adopts the association rules. 20 By referring to these rules in the recorded
declaration, the developer extends a reviewing court's presumption of validity
to the initial board of directors' rules.' 2' Unlike expert rulemakers, the presale board of directors has no experience in operating the association. The
Urban Land Institute estimates that one-half of the board members selected
by the developer before unit sales commence are not qualified to serve in
such responsible positions. 2 2 Accepting that developers promulgate rules too
infrequently to qualify as experts, then the mere reference in the declaration
to rules fashioned by an inexperienced board a fortiori is not expert rulemaking.
Even established condominium associations lack expert qualities. While
administrative agents' daily construction of substantive law fosters practical
expertise, 12 the condominium association's board of directors performs most
of its formal tasks, including rulemaking and enforcement, at a monthly
meeting, and the entire association gathers only annually. 24 Inexperienced
volunteers who head the association often act with enthusiasm but with no
practical management skills.

25

Even when an association officer's interest

119. See Condominium Conversions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Housing and
Consumer Interests of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 241 (1980)
(excerpt from The Conversion of Rental Housing to Condominiums and Cooperatives, submitted for the record by the Office of Policy Dev. and Research, U. S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban
Dev. (condominium conversions should increase by an average of 45,000 units per year until
1985); REPORT TO GOVERNOR BOB GRAHAM, supra note 1, at 4 (in Florida, conversions have
caused the number of condominiums filed annually to triple since 1977).
120. See supra note 7.
121. See, e.g., Juno By the Sea N. Condominium v. Manfredonia, 397 So. 2d 297, 302 &
n.2 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1981) (documents describing board's power to assign parking spaces
incorporated by reference). But cf. Johnson v. Keith, 368 Mass. 316, 318, 331 N.E.2d 879, 882
(1975) (refusing to incorporate the original "house rules" into the recorded bylaws because,
inter alia, the rules were not annexed to the recorded documents). See also Note, supra note
10, at 649-52 (describing the failings of disclosure).
122. See SUCCESSFUL ASSOCIATION, supra note 4, at 12-16 (board's initial actions are a
learning process and the members accrue valuable experience only after rotating on staggered
terms several times).
123. See Woodward & Levin, supra note 22, at 332.
124. FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)(d) (1981). See 1976 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 199
(testimony of Carla Hills) (unworkable bylaws or poor organization made meetings nonproductive); J. HOLEMAN, supra note 4, at 16 (few owners participate in meetings); Court Lays Down
Rules to Govern Voting in Condominium Association Meetings, 2 CONDO. RE'. 5-6 (1974) (describing the confused atmosphere of association meetings caused by rivaling factions), Bylaw
provisions required in Florida are helpful, but not comprehensive. E.g., FLA. STAT.
§ 718.112(2)(a) (1981) (number of officers and board membership); id. § 718.112(2)(b) (proxy
voting); id. § 718.1'12(2)(c) (notice of meetings); 3 FLA. A. CODE, 7D-23.01 to .02 (quorum).
125. See SUCCESSFUL ASSOCIATION, supra note 4, at i (board lacks experience and training).
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wanes, board members are not likely to remove a nonfunctioning volunteer
from an elected position. 1 26 The rulemaking expertise factor, therefore, does
not justify the courts' placement of the burden of persuasion on the challenger
of association rules. The nature of the unit owners' interests, the intricacies of
condominium living, and the rulemakers' inexperience at all levels of condominium operation demand an alternative justification for judicial deference.
The institutional goal of judicial deference to administrative findings is
consistent decisionmaking which permits affected individuals to rely on agency
decisions and to plan their behavior in accordance with federal regulations. 127
Judicial deference also provides administrative agencies flexibility to encounter new and unforeseen problems.12 This administrative flexibility is
imperative to resolve social problems demanding immediate attention.ss
To promote efficiency and consistency, the courts must assure administra-tive accountability and fairness without generating unnecessary delay or
excessive reversal of agency decisions. 130 When individual rights are threatened,
however, systemic goals are secondary considerations. The Florida Supreme
Court has asserted that considerations of convenience, such as expediting the
due administration of justice, should never be controlling in the construction
of constitutional provisions.' 3' Although judicial review of agency action should
not unduly shackle administrative efficiency, individual freedoms would be
sacrificed for government efficiency if the enhancement of systemic goals
were the reviewing court's primary objective. Such judicial restraint would
See also C. NORcaoss, TowNHousEs AND CONDOMINIuMs: R=SDENTs' LuTEs

AND

DIsUKES 19

(1973) (most unit owners were unimpressed by association government).
126. See SUCCESFUL AsSOcIATION, supra note 4, at 12 (recommending shorter terms- of
office). See also D. WOLFE, supra note 16, at 98 (tedious debate and wasted meeting hours
prevent many talented volunteers from participating).
127. See 125 CONG. RE . S12, 149, S12, 149-50 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1979) (letter from Alan
Parker, Assistant United States Attorney General, to Sen. Edward Kennedy> (outlining
historical basis of judicial deference to agency findings) (judicial deference promotes stable
regulation and respects administrative expertise).
128. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979) (courts
willingly grant agencies flexibility); Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 738-39 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (courts grants latitude to agency dealing with scientific frontiers). Cf. House Hearings
1979, supra note 23, at 423 (Judge Leventhal's report) (judicial review should not foster administrative delay). See also Schwartz, Of Administrators and Philosopher-Kings: The Republic, The Laws, and Delegations of Power, 72 Nw. U.L. Rlv. 443, 449 (1979) (specialized
regulation requires administrative discretion and is beyond the competence of Congress
or courts).
129. For areas of related administrative activity, see supra note 13.
130. See United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 236-37, 241 (1973) (requiring
only legislative type proceeding, as described in 1966 amendment to Interstate Commerce Act

§ 1(14)(a), despite stricter statutorily prescribed administrative hearing of Administrative
Procedure Act § 553(c) (1976)); National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688,
698 (2d Cir. 1975) (courts encourage rulemaking); Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U.
PA. L. Ra,. 1267, 1805-10 (1975) (discussing dlexible hearing requirements); Verkuil, Judicial
Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv. 185, 195-96 (1974) (discussing informal hearings). See also Recommendation 72-5 of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 1
C.F.R. § 305.72-5 (1975) (adopted Dec. 14, 1972).
131. See Austin v. Christain, 310 So. 2d 289, 292 (Fla. 1975) (protecting constitutional
rights above administrative expediency and public policy).
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undermine the Constitution's tripartite division of governmental power. 132
Furthermore, judicial deference reduced to judicial inertia would sanction
ill-conceived, irregular rulemaking.1 33 More exacting review may encourage
deliberative, consistent decisionmaking.1 4 Therefore, literal application of the
administrative rule's presumption of validity to condominium rules is based
on an unwarranted concern for efficient condominium government. 35 Moreover, the federal courts' frequent disagreement with agency action indicates
that consistent and efficient administrative decisionmaking only partially
justifies limited judicial review. 36
Because federal administrative agents are executive officers"s 7 authorized
by Congress to administer substantive law," 8s separation of powers principles
further caution against overly ambitious judicial review. The judiciary is
justified in deferring to agency action if court action would unduly encroach
upon the prerogative of the Executive and Congress."s9 If the modern judiciary
is to fulfill its role in the tripartite scheme, however, the separation of powers
maxim also requires probing review of agency decisionmaking. 140 The federal
courts' nondelegation doctrine has addressed this dilemma by requiring
statutory standards for administrative duties to reflect fundamental congressional policy preferences. 14'
132. See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 23, at 423 (Judge Leventhal quoting Chief
Justice Burger) ("efficiency is not the primary goal of a free people"); Leventhal, supra note
23, at 420-448 (checks and balances promote overall efficient allocation of resources). See also
SUBCOMM.

ON SEPARATION OF PowERs OF THE SEN. COMA.

ON THE JUDICIARY, SEPARATION

POWERS AND THE INDEPENDENT AGENCIES: CASES AND SELECTED READINGS, S. Doc. No.

OF

91-49, 91st

Cong., 1st Sess. 90-93 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Senate Document] (separation of powers
implicit in tripartite division of power); THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison).
133. See Volkswagenwerk v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968) (court cannot sanction rules
which have no reasonable basis in law); Woodward & Levin, supra note 22, at 332-33 (presumption of validity is clearly rebuttable).
134. See 125 CONG. REC. S12153-54 (remarks of Sen. Morgan) (stricter judicial review
would encourage reasonable rules and would ultimately increase judicial enforcement).
135. See Juno By the Sea N. Condominium v. Manfredonia, 397 So. 2d at 304 (approving
notice of rulemaking power provided by "awkwardly drawn" provision).
136. See House Hearings 1979, supra note 23, at 434-35 (report submitted by Judge
Leventhal) (between October, 1977, and September, 1978, 31 of the 160 appeals from ad.
ministrative action were fully or partially reversed by the D.C. Circuit Court).
137. See THE FEDERALIST No. 72 (A. Hamilton) (administration of government is an
executive function).
138. See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) (court defers to agency's interpretation of statute). See generally McGarity, Substantive and ProceduralDiscretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions, 67 GEo L.J. 729 (1979). See also K. DAVIS, supra
note 199, at 232.
139. See supra note 124. A certain amount of encroachment is sometimes necessary, unless
one agrees with the classical theorists' view of an impotent judiciary. See SENATE DOCUMENT,
supra note 132, at 3 (quoting John Adams) ("the Judiciary is in some measure next to
nothing").
140. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971); SENATE
DOCUMENT, supra note 132, at 72-73 (judicial review of agency action protects the supremacy
of law).
141. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478, 2510 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (standard must clearly mandate, prohibit, or permit the administrative power
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Although congressional delegations of power to federal administrative
agencies may be rather broad, 142 Florida's nondelegation doctrine strictly prohibits standardless legislative delegations. 43 When an enabling statute and
statements of legislative intent fail to specify decisionmaking guidelines, the
Florida Constitution's explicit separation of powers provision requires the
courts. to invalidate such overbroad delegations of power 4 4 Thus, courts have
struck down decisionmaking at all governmental levels, 4 5 and condominium
rulemaking should be no exception. Because condominium association action
triggers state action,14 6 the nondelegation doctrine should be applied at this
government level.
The nondelegation doctrine requires courts to examine the statutory source
of rulemaking power. 47 The Florida Condominium Act provides no standards
for declaration rules but requires "reasonable" association rules. 4 8 The Florida
courts have determined that this delegation requires condominium regulators
to act within the statutory scope of authority as defined by the condominium's
legal documents.14 9 The courts prohibit an arbitrary or capricious abuse of that
exercised); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (lack of standard
invalidates delegation of legislative power). But see STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON LEGISLATIVE
OVERSIGHT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSrATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.,
REPORT PURSUANT TO § 136 OF THE LEGISLATIVE REORGANIZATION ACT AND H.

RES. 566 (Comm.

Print 1960) (standards are so broad that they are meaningless). See also Industrial Union
Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 442 U.S. 938 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) ("one might
wish that Congress had spoken with greater clarity').
142. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976) (commission may promulgate rules "necessary or appropriate in the public interest").
143. Unlike the United States Constitution, the Florida Constitution contains an express
separation of powers provision. FLA. CONsr. art. II,§ 3. The constitution's tripartite division
of legislative, executive and judicial power and this provision, id., prohibit standardless delegations of power. See id. art. III, § 1; id. art IV; § 1, id. art V, § 1; Note, Florida'sAdherence
to the Doctrineof Nondelegation of Legislative Power, 7 FI.A. ST. U.L. REv. 541, 541-42 (1979).
Cf. THE FEERALIsr Nos. 47-51 (J. Madison) (implicit separation of powers maximum prohibits only legislative delegations which place the whole power of one department in the
hands of another); STORY COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTIrtrnON §§ 525-27 (1833) (same). See
also Martin, The Delegation Issue in Administrative Law -Florida vs. Federal, 53 FLA. B.J.

35, 39 (1979).
144. See Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 925 (Fla. 1979) (until constitution is amended, standards must guide administration of legislative programs); Florida Home
Builders Ass'n v. Division of Labor, 367 So. 2d 219, 220 (Fla. 1979) (standard of "need"

inadequate); Dickinson v. State, 227 So. 2d 36, 88 (Fla. 1969) ("need" standard inadequate).
145. See City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 764, 768 (Fla. 1975) (delegation by municipality to rent control administrator); City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel,
Inc., 261 So. 2d 801, 805 (Fla. 1972) (same).
146. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
147. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 101 S.Ct. 2478, 2490 (1981) (starting
point of analysis of rulemaking power is the enabling statute); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442
U.S. 330, 337 (1979); Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 918-19 (Fla. 1979).
148. FA. STAT. § 718.123(1) (1981).
149. See, e.g., Juno By the Sea N. Condominium v. Manfredonia, 397 So. 2d at 302. The
sources of condominium rulemaking power are the enabling statute, declaration, and bylaws.
FLA. STAT. § 718.503(2) (a), (b), (), (o) (1981); Scavo, supra note 1, at n.57. See Note, supra
note 10, at 648 (by allowing developers to define their own rulemaking power, the courts
have increased the danger of abuse). See also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)
(unconstitutional delegation to private interest).
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authority.150 Nevertheless, even though the frequent intrusion of condo1 51
minium rules into unit owners' privacy should heighten judicial scrutiny,
the courts have not determined whether the delegation of legislative power to
152
condominium associations violates Florida's separation of powers principle.
The Florida Supreme Court's recent affirmation of the nondelegation
doctrine 53 threatens the Florida Condominium Act's delegation of rulemaking
power to associations. In Florida Home Builders Association v. Division of
Labor,54 the legislature had required the Bureau of Apprenticeships to
approve employers' apprenticeship programs based on a standard of need.
The Bureau denied plaintiff's application, but the Florida Supreme Court
invalidated the statute as an unconstitutional legislative delegation. The critical factor was the statute's failure to provide criteria to aid the agency's determination of an applicant's need. The court found that the sole standard of
need was too vague to evince legislative intent.15 5
The Florida Home Builders decision provides an analogy to the delegation
issue under the Condominium Act. Requiring the condominium association to
adopt reasonable rules and regulations is no more precise than requiring an
agency to approve applications based on need. 56 Because of this lack of legisla150. See Plaza Del Prado Condominium Ass'n v. Richman, 345 So. 2d 851, 852 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1977) (attempted enforcement of architectural restriction one year after violation is
arbitrary and capricious abuse of authority); Hidden Harbour Estates v. Norman, 309 So. 2d
180, 181-82 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1975) (association cannot adopt arbitrary or capricious rules).
151. See Smith v. Portante, 212 So. 2d 298, 299 (Fla. 1968) (privacy right of prospective
jurors heightens judicial scrutiny of jury commissioner's information gathering). See also
Scavo & Voss, Community Association Late Fees and Publication of Delinquencies: Are They
Legal?, 7 REAL Es-r. L.J. 216, 2534-36 (1979) (board's publication of delinquent assessment
payments violates unit owners' privacy).
152. See, e.g., Hidden Harbour Estates v. Norman, 309 So. 2d at 182 (concluding that the
challenged rule was within the authority granted). See also Note, supra note 10, at 661
(Florida's inquiry excludes examination of the legislative delegation).
153. See supra note 145.
154. 367 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1979).
155. Id. at 220. See Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 918-19 (Fla. 1979).
156. Compare FLA. STAT. § 718.123(l) (1981) with 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-183. See 367
So. 2d at 220 (neither 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 77-183 nor its legislative history specify standards
or policies to guide the agencies); 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-400, § 262 (correcting grammatical
error); 1977 Fla. Laws, ch. 72-222, § I ("reasonable" standard circularly defined as "prohibiting rules which would unreasonably restrict any unit owner's right'); FLA. S. 94, § I (Reg.
Sess. 1977, introduced by S. Meyers and S. Gordon) (commentary focusing on unit owners'
right to assemble); See also American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478
(1981) (construing the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78
(1976)). The enabling statute examined in American Textile requires the Secretary of Labor
to set standards for toxic materials in the work environment that will protect employees'
health "to the extent feasible." 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5). Congress established that the standard
should mandate working conditions "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide . . .
healthful employment." Id. § 652(8). Although the court upheld the delegation based on the
more specific "feasibility" standard, 101 S. Ct. at 2492, the court questioned the viability of
"reasonably necessary and appropriate" as a guidepost for setting standards. Id. Congress'
"reasonably necessary and appropriate" provision, like the Florida Condominium Act's reasonableness standard, lacks elucidating legislative history. See id. at 2493 n.33 ("there is no discussion in the legislative history of the meaning of the phrase 'reasonably necessary or appropriate' "). Therefore, the similarity between Congress' "reasonably necessary and appropri-
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tive guidance, Florida circuit courts have held that the Act requires a condominimum association rule to protect the unit owners' "life, liberty, and general
welfare."'15 Appellate courts have disagreed and substituted a more easily
satisfied "health, happiness, and enjoyment of life" requirement., 58 Neither
the statute nor its legislative history resolves this fundamental disagreement
over the purpose of condominium rules. 59 Likewise, the absence of declaration
rulemaking standards has limited the ability of courts to test the validity of
declaration rules.160 Such broad legislative delegations amenable to conflicting
interpretations increase the danger that limited judicial review will sanction
nondeliberative, arbitrary rulemaking.16 '
Proponents of broad delegations of administrative authority argue that
procedural due process safeguards against administrative caprice adequately
supplant the separation of powers' protection against broadly delegated
63
power. 2 Although the Florida Supreme Court has rejected this argument,
the current statute adequately prescribes constitutionally required procedures
to guide procedural judicial review. For example, the statute requires that
the board open its meetings to all unit owners and post conspicuous advance
notice of the meeting time and place." The Florida courts have not, however,
constrained condominium rulemaking by focusing on the procedural fairness
of the rulemaking process. To the contrary, the courts have relied on the
notice fiction to establish a presumption of validity for declaration rules and
to increase the association rule challenger's burden of proof.6 5 Regardless,
ate" requirement and the Florida Condominium Act's "reasonable' standard indicates the
legislature's delegation to condominium rulemakers might not meet the requirements of the
more liberal federal nondelegation doctrine. See Id. at 2510 & n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(Congress' failure to either mandate, permit or prohibit a particular basis for setting standards
is grounds for invoking the nondelegation doctrine).
157.

See supra note 80.

158. See supra note 24. See also Ryan v. Baptiste, 565 S.W.2d 196, 198 (Mo. CL App.
1978); Holloman v. Mission Trace Homeowners Ass'n, 556 S.W.2d 632, 635-36 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977) (adopting Hidden Harbour's standard).
159. See supra notes 157-68.
160. See FLA. STAT. § 718.503(2)G), (o) (1981). Also see cases cited in note 25 supra.
161. See Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 918-19 (Fla. 1978) (court cannot
determine whether agency is furthering legislative intent if standards are inadequate).
162. See 1 K. DAvis, supra note 19, § 3.15 (strict legislative guidelines for delegations
of power decrease governmental efficiency). But see Wright, Book Review, 81 Yale L.J. 575, 58586 (1972) (loosely delegated power undermines decisionmaking and does not always promote
efficiency).
163. See Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 924 (Fla. 1978) (standardless
delegations, even with procedural protections, violate Florida's Constitution); K. DAvis, supra
note 23, at 32; Note, supra note 143, at 552-54.
164. See FLA. STAT. § 718.112(2)2.(c) (1981 .See also J. VAN DoRE note 4, at 13-17 (discussing statutory requirements of condominium documents). Neither the procedural requirements for condominium rulemaking in Florida nor those for informal rulemaking by
federal agencies are extensive. Congress felt extensive procedural requirements on informal
administrative action would defeat the purpose of informal proceedings and undermine
administrative flexibility. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm. on the
Judiciary on S.674, S.675, and S-918, 77th Cong., ist Sess. 804-06 (1,941).

165. See supra note 98. But see Papalexiou v. Tower W. Condominium, 167 N.J. Super.
516, 529, 401 A.2d 280, 286 (Ch. Div. 1979); Holleman v. Mission Trace Homeowners Ass'n,
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inexpert condominium rulemakers' mere compliance with procedural requirements would not ensure reasonable rulemaking. 166 Thus, the legislature's
failure to adopt a preferred interpretation of the reasonableness standard, the
courts' distortion of procedural protections, and the practical inadequacy of
procedural review necessitate substantive review of condominium rulemaking.
THE NEED FOR SUBSTANTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF CONDOMINIUM RULEMAKING

When reviewing condominium rules, the judiciary must protect the
competing interests of developers, condominium associations, and individual
unit owners. Developers seek judicial enforcement of declaration rules to
maintain control over condominiums for the duration of their contractual
interest. 167 Enforcement of reasonable rules also fosters stability and protects
unit purchasers seeking a continued restrictive scheme. 168 Although the condominium association possesses little rulemaking expertise16 9 judicial support
for the board's informed decisionmaking provides it with credibility and
promotes community respect for its rules.170 Unit owners, however, need
judicial protection from substantively unreasonable rules which are arbitrarily promulgated or enforced. Therefore, the substantive review standard

must protect unit owners' legitimate rights and promote rulemaking integrity.
The standard must also be one which prevents a barrage of spurious suits
that disrupt the condominium's stability and overburden the court system.
A Single ReasonablenessStandard Would Alleviate
PrejudiceAgainst Rule Challengers
The presumption of validity surrounding declaration rules is stronger
than the presumption of regularity favoring condominium association rules. 17'
By facilitating judicial enforcement of declaration rules, a judicial presumption
protects the contractual interests of developers and buyers. The disclosure
556 S.W. 2d 632, 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
166. The expertise of administrative agents has been questioned. See 125 CONG. REG.
S12, 150-51 (remarks of Sen. Domenici) (the presumption of validity based on the agencies'
expertise is an anachronistic administrative law principle inconsistent with modem pervasive
regulation); id. at S12165 (remarks of Sen. Bumpers) (the court should not defer to administrative action unless the record actually reflects expert decisionmaking).
167. See Note, supra note 10, at 653 (discussing the need for judicial enforcement of
rules).
168. See, e.g., Wilshire Condominium Ass'n v. Kohlbrand, 368 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.
1979) (pet restriction); Coquina Club, Inc. v. Mantz, 342 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1977) (age
restriction). Enforcement of such restrictions satisfies owners' expections and attracts buyers
with similar desires. This creates an attractive market, which is consistent with legislative
goals. See S. REs. No. 281, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, 16-17 (1962) (state condominium enabling
statutes and federal condominium mortgage insurance were designed to promote home ownership).
169. See supra notes 123-126 and accompanying text.
170. See W. WOLFE, supra note 17, at 81 (court reversal undermines the integrity of
condominium rulemakers).
171. See supra notes 24 & 25.
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and sporadic substantive regulation involved in a complex condominium transaction, however, 172 inadequately protects buyers. Judicial deference subordinates the rights of purchasers to rulemaking stability. Developers often
do not adequately disclose existing declaration rules nor the association's future
rulemaking power.173 Consequently, unit owners need judicial protection from
both arbitrary association rulemaking and substantively unreasonable declara1 74
tion rules.
If significant extra-judicial substantive controls were applied to condo-

minium rules, a presumption of validity would be justified. For example, preliminary substantive review by the Florida Division of Land Sales and Condiminiums 76 would increase buyers' protection from unreasonable rules. Some
states' regulatory agencies do evaluate the fairness of developers' documents
before sale. 76 If Florida mandated such expert evaluation of declaration rules
prior to sale, then the strong judicial presumption surrounding declaration
rules would be proper. Until appropriate legislative action justifies the
judicial presumption favoring declaration rules, however, only substantive
177
judicial review can compensate for the present scheme's inadequacy.
In principle, the recently defeated Bumper Amendment to the federal
Administrative Procedures Act' 78 supported the demise of presumptive validity
172. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text; Note, supra note 53, at 396-400 (condominium buyers are unable to interpret or apply the disclosed information and are more
vulnerable to disclosure abuses than are corporate shareholders). Cf. Gould v. AmericanHawaiian SS. Co., 535 .F.2d 761, 774 (3d Cir. 1976) (construing SEC Proxy Rule, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-5(a) (1981)) (information disclosed must be intelligible).
173. See supranote 121.
174. See White Egret Condominium v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979) (arbitrary enforcement of declaration restriction held not judicially enforceable); Winston Towers 200
Ass'n v. Saverio, 860 So. 2d 470, 471 (Fla. 8d D.C.A. 1978) (invalidating association's adoption
of pet ban with retroactive impact).
175. See FLA. STAT. § 718.501 (1981) (empowering Department of Business Regulation
to regulate condominiums). The agency has the power to promulgate rules and regulations
for condominium formation and operation. FLA. STAT. § 718.501(1)(d) (1981). See, e.g., 8 FLA.
AD. CODE, 70-15; Lecture Outlines, CLE 7th Annual Condominium Seminar, The Florida Bar,
appendix B (1980). Furthermore, the division may investigate complaints, adjudicate disputes,
and enforce provisions of the Condominium Act. FLA. STAT. § 718.501(l)(a), (b) (1981). But
see Peck Plaza Condominium v. Division of Fla. Land Sales &Condominiums, 871 So. 2d 152
((Fla. 1st D.C.A. 11979) (Dep't of Business Reg. cannot interpret vague declaration provisions).
Although the bureau does review the contents of the documents, the examiner primarily
ensures that the developer has complied with the broad statutory requirements. See 8 FLA. AD.
CoDE 7D-17.05. The effectiveness of this protective measure is limited by the fact that the
statute grants considerable flexibility to drafters of condominium operation documents. See
Mayberry, supra note 63, at 141.
176. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PRor. CODE §§ 11018, 11025 (Deering 1980) (vesting power in
the Real Estate Commissioner to determine the fairness and feasibility of a condominium
project). See alsm J. VAN DoREN, supra note 4, at 90 (California approach involves intense
investigations); Wenig & Schulz, supra note 51, at 239 (test provides assurance for buyers);
Note, supra note 58, at 400-01 (the fairness test shifts the burden from buyers to state agencies
to curb developer abuses). For a discussion of California condominium law in general, see
H.

supra note 54.
Cf. N.Y. Gna. LAWS § 852-e(4) (McKinney 1968) (registration of an offering does not

RoTHENBERG,

177.

constitute administrative approval of the merits of the project).
178. S. 111, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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in condominium declaration rule review. The amendment contemplated
stricter judicial review of agency action by eliminating the judicial presumption
of agency rule validity." 9 The amendment's supporters primarily intended
to protect individuals affected by federal agency action. 80 Senator Bumpers
sponsored the amendment to reduce the burden that the presumption favoring
administrative actions has placed on individuals. Supporters of the amendment
argued that when agency overregulation compels an aggrieved citizen to
litigate, the individual's burden to overcome both the agency's greater res
sources and the presumption of validity precludes a fair fight. '

The Bumper Amendment's focus on aggrieved individuals captures the
essence of condominium rule disputes. Although unit owners' problems have
not been rampant, some affected owners have suffered a serious impact.' 8' The
declaration, often buried among a number of complex legal documents,
contains or refers to the developer's rules.18 ' Disclosure of declaration rules is
84
thus often ineffective despite potentially great adverse impact on the buyer.1
Therefore, reducing the strong presumption of validity afforded declaration
rules is consistent with the Bumper Amendment's concern for individual
interests. A judicial presumption that unjustifiably favors rulemakers also over85
whelmingly prejudices the aggrieved individuals.
The Bumper Amendment failed, in part, because it rejected longstanding
administrative law principles. 8 6 Condominium rulemaking, however, has no
such set of competing principles to justify rejection of the Bumper Amend179. Id. Senator Bumpers introduced the bill in two earlier sessions of the Congress, but
the bill was not considered by the Senate. See S. 86, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 2408, 94th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1975). The Senator has made several statements in support of his proposed
removal of the presumption of administrative rule validity. See 125 CONG. RFc. S12146-48;
125 CONG. Rec. S411 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1979); 123 CONG. REc. S286 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1977);
122 CONG. REC. SI1350 (daily ed. July 1, 1976); 121 CONG. REC. S29956 (1975); House Hearings
1979, supra note 23, at 743. The bill received little serious attention, however, until the
summer of 1979 when the ABA House of Delegates meeting in Dallas, Texas voted to support
the Bumper amendment. Telephone interview with Bill Massey, Legislative Director for
Senator Bumpers, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 18, 1981). See House Hearings 1979, supra, at 747.
But see id. at 424-25 (report submitted by Judge Leventhal) (the vote in Dallas was a "brush
fire" reversal of the recommendation of the Administrative Law Section of the ABA). The
Bumpers proposal became part of the Regulation Reform Act of 1979, passed the Senate,
but was defeated by the House. Telephone interview with Bill Massey, supra.
180. Cf. Fla. S. 619, Fla. H. 1398 (Reg. Sess. 1976) (introduced by S. Gallen & S. Ware)
(proposed amendment to Fla. Const. art. I, § 18, empowering the legislature to nullify administrative rules which exceed delegated authority), construed in Smathers v. Smith, 338
So. 2d 825, 829 (Fla. 1976) (legislature intended to curb administrative abuse of individual
interests). This amendment was defeated in the November 2, 1976 general election.
181. See 125 Cong. Rec. S12165 (remarks of Sen. Bumpers) (judicial deference to an
agency is tantamount to a presumption of the individual's guilt); House Hearings 1979, supra
note 23, at 744, 747, 751 (presumption prejudices litigation).
182. See 1976 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 185 (testimony of Carla Hills) (overall
satisfaction of unit owners is high, but specific problems are sometimes serious). See also
DEvELOPo's ROLE, supra note 4, at 10 & n.2 (citing studies showing unit owners' satisfaction).
183. See supra note 121.
184. See supra notes 65-69.
185. See supra notes 168 & 183.
186. See supra note 127.
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ment's premise. Subjective rulemaking by inexperienced developers vitiates a
major administrative law justification for presumptive judicial validation of
administrative action: decisionmaker expertise.'187 Furthermore, the limited resources of the typical declaration rule challenger should alleviate critics' fears
of excessive litigation. Presumption advocates predicted that large corporations

would use the Bumper Amendment to delay promulgation of industrial regulations, and thereby significantly increase the federal courts' workload.1 ss It
would be profitable, they argued, for the corporation to prolong its normal
production methods even at the expense 6f challenging an administrative
rule.

Relative to corporate entities, condominium rule challengers are impecunious litigants. 89 They generally lack resources to expend on spurious
litigation designed to delay rule promulgation. 90 Even if they had the capital,
unit owners lack the corporate profit motive to delay enforcement. Nevertheless, rule compliance requiring significant expense or great personal sacrifice
may motivate a unit owner to litigate. Economically disadvantaged or
emotionally charged unit owners often resist rule enforcement and force the
association to seek a court injunction despite the judicial presumption of rule
validity.' 9' Unit owners' relative lack of finances may temper the potential increase in litigation, but a resolute individual might still prefer litigation to
compliance in the absence of a judicial presumption. 19 2 Increased judicial enforcement of reasonable rules, however, would ultimately discourage frivolous
litigation. By subjecting declaration and association rules to the same reasonableness test, strict substantive review would encourage developers to promul93
gate reasonable, enforceable rules.'

187. See supra text accompanying notes 112-19.
188. See Coo. Rac. S12152 (remarks of Sen. Dole). See also id. at 12157 (letter from
Chief Justice Burger to Sen. Kennedy) (removing presumption that any rule or regulation
of any agency is valid would increase federal courts' workload); House Hearings 1979, supra
note 28, at 425 (Judge Leventhal's report) (same); McGowan, Congress, Court and Control
of Delegated Power, 77 COLuM. L. Rav. 1119, 1168 (1977).
189. See Stiff, Behavioral Analysis of Condominium Residents in the Clearwater, Florida
Area 44 (1975) (unpublished thesis in University of Florida undergraduate Library) (fifty
percent of the representative sample of Clear-water condominium residents paid less than
$25,000 for their unit and earned under $15,000 annually).
190. See Arnold, Class Actions in Florida-A New Look, 31 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 551 n.7,
552 n.12 (1979) (condominium association class action lessens unit owners' economic disadvantage).
191. See, e.g., Kroop v. Caravelle Condominium, Inc., 323 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 3d D.CA.
1975) (owner prevented from leasing unit). See also East Midtown Plaza Hous. Co. v. Halpern
(Civ. Ct. N.Y.) in N.Y.LJ., Feb. 5, 1973, at 19, col. 4 (elderly woman ordered to remove 17
year old, blind and toothless dog).
192. See Winston Towers 200 Ass'n, Inc. v. Saverio, 860 So. 2d 470-71 (Fla. 3d D.CA.
1978) (pet restriction adopted by association); PRACTrCING LAw INsTruTE, supra note 2, at 5965 (copies of trial court final judgment and correspondence between the board and Mr.
Saverio).
193. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
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Placingan InitialBurden on the Rulemaker Would
FacilitateSubstantive Review and Promote
Consistently Enforceable Condominium Rulemaking
In administrative law, substantive judicial review of the rulemaking process seeks to determine if a reasonable administrative decision was made in
view of the evidence that was before the agency.19 4 A substantive evaluation,
therefore, requires the agency to present comprehensible evidence to the reviewing court. The agency's failure to produce an adequate record of the
evidence it considered in the decisionmaking process precludes effective substantive review. 195 A lengthy record developed according to all procedural requirements may still fail to demonstrate substantive reasonableness. 98 An
"adequate" record, not just a lengthy one, must be presented to offer the court
qualitative insight into the rulemaking process. 97
To improve the administrative decisionmaking process, federal courts have
occasionally shifted the initial burden of persuasion to the rulemaker. 198 When
administrative action affects individual rather than corporate interests, courts
are especially willing to place the burden on the agency to prove the appropriateness of its action. 99 Likewise, when the conclusions underlying the agency's
rule apparently conflict with analyses or data of concerned participants in the
rulemaking process, the court tends to impose an affirmative initial burden
20 0
on agencies to present rational support for their rules.
A Florida appellate court recently applied this administrative law innovation to condominium rulemaking review in Hidden HarbourEstates v. Basso.29 '

Claiming that additional wells would increase the salinity of Hidden
Harbour's water supply, the condominium association's board of directors
194. See Gifford, supra note 22, at 600-02 & n.l1l; Oakes, supra note 30, at 50031.
195. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(requiring explanation of the agency's assumptions); DeLong, supra note 28, at 290-96.
196. See Oakes, supra note 30, at 50030.
197. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 36 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Wright, J.), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 941 (1976); Note, supra note 28, at 315-16.
198. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 377 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (rulemaker must demonstrate the achievability of its standard); National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 431-34
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (burden on agency to promulgate and explain reasonable rule); United States
v. Nova Scotia Food Prods., 568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 1977) (requiring scientific evidence
supportive of chosen methodology); Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. OSHRC, 534 F.2d 541,
551 (3d Cir. 1976) (decisionmaker must demonstrate reasonableness of adopted standard);
Bunny Bear, Inc. v. Peterson, 473 F.2d 1002, 1007 (1st Cir. 1973) (agency's explanation must
reveal reasonable decisionmaking). See also K. DAvIs, supra note 20, § 6:15; DeLong, supra
note 28, at 296; Gifford, The Morgan Cases: A Retrospective View, 30 AD. L. REV. 237, 267-69
(1978); Leventhal, supra note 30, at 435-36.
199. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); cf. Avila S. Condominium Ass'n. v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599, 610 (England, J.,
dissenting) (advocating shifting the burden to the developer to prove that a unit owner is not
a proper member of the condominium association class action suit).
200. See Associated Indus. of N.Y. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 354 (2d
Cir. 1973); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 642, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Gifford, supra note 22, at 593.
201. 393 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1981).
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denied Basso's request to drill his own well. Before the denial, a board
member's study had revealed that an additional well would not aggravate the
water salinity problem. 02 The court concluded that, because of this inconsistency, the board failed to meet its burden of demonstrating a reasonable relationship between its denial and the stated purpose. Therefore, the
court would not order Basso to comply with the board's decision. Only if the
board could demonstrate increased salinity, the court concluded, would a
20 3
court injunction be issued to prevent future well drilling.
By placing the initial burden on the condominium rulemaker, substantive
review protects unit owners from arbitrary, capricious, or maliciously enforced
rules. As Basso illustrates, an initial requirement that the challenged rulemaker demonstrate the reasonableness of rules necessitates deliberative rulemaking. Before the court will enforce a rule under the Basso approach, the
decisionmaker must establish a rational basis for its action in the rulemaking
record.2 0 4 The board of directors would thereby be required to explain the
reasonableness of association rules and to justify enforcement of declaration
rules. Fear of court reversal under substantive review of the record would,
therefore, encourage rulemakers to choose procedures likely to generate an
adequate record.20 5 For example, the board could protect its decisions from a
court's cursory invalidation by promulgating decisionmaking standards,
inviting community involvement through hearings or written suggestions, and
promptly notifying interested parties of its decisions. 206 Unit owners would be
better protected from substantively unreasonable rules by rulemaking procedures which are more accessible to affected parties and more sensitive to
20 7
competing interests.
Shifting the initial burden to the rulemaker again poses the danger of increased litigation.2 08 Spurious lawsuits could undermine the rulemakers' integrity and overburden the courts. If the suggested standard generates the
anticipated rulemaking improvements, 20 9 noncompliance would be only a

temporary

2

result. 10

The procedures necessary to produce substantively review-

able records would often placate incensed rule challengers by providing them
a meaningful opportunity for comment.211 Likewise, an improved rulemaking
process and the board's burden to explain its rules would ultimately lead to
stricter and more consistent judicial enforcement of condominium rules.
202. Id. at 638.

203. Id. at 640-41.

204. Id. See id. at 641 (concurring opinion).
205. See Oakes, supra note 30, at 50032; Note, supra note 28, at 322.
206. See D. WoLrE, supra note 16 at 76; cf. 105 U.S.C. § 553 (1976) (minimal procedural
requirements for agencies). See also A r'Y GEN.'S CO-M. ON AD. PRoc., FINAL RxP. ON AD.
PROc. IN GoV'T AGENCIES,

S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 102-08 (1941) (describing tra-

ditional notice and comment rulemaking procedures).
207. See cases cited in note 165, supra. See also Note, supra note 10, at 665 (comparing
condominium rulemaking to corporate decisionmaking).
208. See supra notes 188-193 and accompanying text.
209. See supra text accompanying note 206.
210. See Note, supra note .28, at 323; see supra note 134.
211. See D. WOLFE, supra note 16, at 84; SUCCESSFUL AssocIltoN, supra note 4, at 14.
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Judicial support for condominium rulemakers would create an incentive for
internal dispute resolution 21 2 and discourage unit owners from resorting to
court action.213 Furthermore, the reasonableness standard does not completely
jettison the judicial presumption favoring rulemakers. Doubts as to whether
the rulemaker has met its burden should be resolved in the rulemaker's
favor, 214 since the need for consistent decisionmaking warrants some degree of
judicial deference.
Because improved decisionmaking would facilitate judicial review of condominium rulemaking, a qualitative decrease in the courts' workload would
complement the numerical reduction of rule challenges.21 5 While fewer rules
would be contested in court, those that were challenged could be explained
more thoroughly. The need for the court to steep itself in evidence to perform
competent judicial review -would diminish.2 16 For example, a Virginia trial
court 217 recently engaged in costly, time consuming evidentiary investigation

to determine the substantive reasonableness of an architectural restriction
against television antennae. Although the court heard evidence and testimony
against the restriction and actually visited the site, the court based its decision
to invalidate the restriction on the board of directors' inadequate supportive
research. 21 8 By imposing an initial burden on the board to explain its rule,
the Virginia court could have reached the same conclusion without wasting
21 9

judicial resources.

CONCLUSION

The Florida Legislature has responded to the state's growth in condominiums by fashioning substantive regulations to protect the competing needs
and expectations of developers, condominium associations, and unit owners.
The legislature has continued its efforts to protect these interests in various
facets of condominium formation and operation, but has neglected the rulemaking area.2 2 0 The legislature's silence should encourage the courts to establish commensurate substantive controls on rulemaking.
212. See P. ROHAN & M. RESKtN, supra note 36, § 17A.05[1] (1975); How To KEEP CONDO
DxsvtrrEs OUT OF COURT, 2 CONIEoMNIUM REP. 6 (1974) (suggesting internal tribunal to
minimize court intervention in condominium disputes). New York has rejected a bill which
would have provided arbitration of disputes between the board and unit owners. See N.Y.
Assembly 10221 (195th Sess. 1972).
213. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
214. See Gifford, supra note 22, at 594 n.84.
215. See Note, supra note 28, at 323.
216. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (principled agency action improves the administrative process and facilitates judicial
review).
217. Sudley Square v. Quigley, Chan. No. 6835 (Pr. Win. County Va. 1975).
218. Id., quoted in D. WOLFE, supra note 16, at 81. See also Hyatt, supra note 35, at 100405 (discussing the Virginia decision); Restrictive Covenants. Tight Drafimanship Will Prevent
Problems, 3 CONDOMINIUM REP. 2 (1975) (same).

219. See supra note 198.
220. Compare 1979 Fla. Laws, ch. 79-314 § 9 (extending warranties to subsequent purchasers) with id., ch. 79-400, § 262 (correcting grammatical error in existing rulemaking provision). See generally Kutun, Condominiums and Recent Legislative Action in Florida, 55
FLA. B.J. 148 (1981).
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Even if the legislature's silence was not intended to encourage judicial
activism, the courts mus protect individual unit owners' rights that are
threatened by legislative inaction. 221 The courts could best provide this protection by requiring that rules be reasonable and by substantively reviewing
the evidence considered by rulemakers. Placing an initial burden on the
rulemaker to coherently present supportive evidence for its rules would facilitate substantive review. Although one Florida court has adopted this
approach, 222 a consistent standard is needed to promote certainty. Unless
the burden consistently falls on the rulemaker to demonstrate the reasonableness of its rules, litigants will have to speculate whether the particular facts of their case warrant shifting the burden. Such unpredictability offers
rulemakers little guidance and aggravates the confusion inherent in the conceptual complexity of condominium property ownership. To alleviate this
confusion, it is incumbent upon the judiciary to fill the void in Florida's im-

precise Condominium Act.
JAMmS

M. GRIPPANDO

221. $ee Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 (1967) (courts must protect individual
rights threatened by inadequate legislative action); Dade County Classroom Teachers Ass'n
v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684, 687 (Fla. 1972) (same). See also House Hearings 1979, supra
note 23, at 438-49 (Judge Leventhal's report) (standards for review of administrative action
are consistent with the APA, but are largely common law innovations).
222. Hidden Harbor Estates v. Basso, 898 So. 2d 637, 640 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1981) (board
must demonstrate relationship between its action and the objectives sought). A more recent
case, however, undermines this trend. See Lyons v. King, 397 So. 2d 964, 967, 969-70 (Fla. 4th
D.C.A. 1981) (finding support for board's action even though board member's testimony expressly negated the majority's rationale).
Although the Basso and Lyons courts reviewed the reasonableness of the rule as applied
rather than the reasonableness of the rule itself, the reasonableness standard apparently
applied in either instance. Id. at 968-69 (Hurley, J., dissenting) (citing White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin, 879 So. 2d 46, 350-51 (Fla. 1979) (rule must be reasonable and
its application non-arbitrary). See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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